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ABSTRACT
Objective: To assess the impact of ward or bay
closures, specifically, whether prompt closure of an
affected ward shortens the duration of norovirus
outbreaks and the resulting disruption in hospitals.
Design: Analysis of summary data from hospitals on
outbreaks of norovirus from 2009 to 2012.
Methods: Using a large outbreak surveillance dataset,
we examined the duration of outbreaks, duration of
disruption, ward closures, the number of patients and
staff affected and the number of lost bed-days, as
functions of the timing of closure. We conducted
Quasi-Poisson regression analyses to assess the effect
of ward closure (timing of closure) on outcome
measures, controlling for time of year (winter or
summer), ward size and ward type (elderly care
wards).
Results: Regression analysis indicates that after
controlling for season ward size and type, the duration
of outbreak and duration of disruption were shorter,
fewer patients were affected by the time of closure and
fewer patients were affected overall, when closure
occurred promptly (within 3 days of the first case
becoming ill) compared with non-prompt closure
groups. However, in outbreaks where wards were not
closed, the length of outbreaks were similar to the
prompt closure group and also had fewer patients and
staff affected and fewer cases per day of outbreak
compared with prompt closure.
Conclusions: Closing a bay or ward promptly in an
outbreak of norovirus leads to a shorter duration of
outbreaks, a shorter duration of disruption and fewer
patients being affected compared with outbreaks where
wards were not promptly closed. However, the
interpretation of these results is not straightforward.
The outbreaks where the ward was not closed at all
have similar characteristics in terms of the duration of
outbreak and fewer people were affected compared
with the baseline prompt closure group.
INTRODUCTION
Outbreaks of diarrhoea and vomiting due to
norovirus are common in hospitals. These
outbreaks can be disruptive, affect many
patients and staff, lead to ward closures and
cancelled operations due to staff sickness
and lost bed-days. Norovirus outbreaks can
occur at any time of year but most of the out-
breaks happen during winter months, a time
when there are increased competing
demands for hospitals services.1 2 Estimates
for the cost of norovirus outbreaks vary
between US$650 000 for a single outbreak in
the USA,3 £115 million nationally for
England4 and £1.2 million over a 2-year
period in one region in Scotland.5
Evaluating the effectiveness of individual
components of infection control measures is
challenging, and the published literature on
infection control measures do not provide
definitive answers.6 Measures introduced to
control outbreaks, such as cohort or barrier
nursing, enhanced cleaning, visitor restric-
tions and ward closures, are implemented
concurrently, rather than individually. One
observational study suggested that closing
bays or wards within 3 days of the first person
becoming ill shortened the length of noro-
virus outbreaks.4
Recent cost effectiveness and simulation
studies7 8 question the need for a complete
ward closure. In addition, new multiagency
guidelines in the UK on the control of noro-
virus outbreaks in hospitals and care homes
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ A large standardised data set for analysis.
▪ This analysis provides a baseline should infec-
tion control strategies move away from whole-
ward closures as the new guidelines suggest.
▪ A weakness is that analysis was carried out on
summary data collected on outbreaks from a
national web-based reporting scheme, which
makes it difficult to unpick some of the ques-
tions around the ward characteristics which influ-
ence differences in the outcomes.
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move away from a strategy of whole-ward closure to one
of the managing strategies within bays.9 Guidelines in
the USA recognising the paucity of strong evidence
suggest that the decision of ward closure should be
based on risk assessment by infection prevention person-
nel. The categorisation of this measure in the US guide-
lines is described as a weak recommendation and that
the evidence for ward closure is low quality.10
Using a large outbreak surveillance dataset, we aimed
to assess the impact of ward or bay closures, specifically
whether prompt closure of an affected ward shortens
the duration of norovirus outbreaks and the resulting
disruption in hospitals.
METHODS
Data sources
We used data from the national Hospital Norovirus
Outbreak Reporting Scheme (HNORS), established by
the Health Protection Agency (HPA) in 2009. This
reporting scheme collects summary data on the out-
breaks of diarrhoea and vomiting that occur in hospitals
in England that are either laboratory confirmed or are
suspected to be due to norovirus. Users of the system
are provided with definitions in order to standardise the
surveillance.
Outbreak definition
Outbreaks were defined as follows: Suspected outbreak: two
or more patients who have either two episodes of vomit-
ing or diarrhoea, or one episode of diarrhoea and vomit-
ing, occurring on a ward within the hospital without
laboratory confirmation. A confirmed outbreak: as above
with laboratory confirmation of norovirus (where at least
one specimen is positive for norovirus).
Most of the National Health Service (NHS) laborator-
ies use either PCR or ELISA for detection of norovirus.
For the purposes of reporting to HNORS, the HPA does
not set minimum standards on what constitute labora-
tory confirmation; this is determined locally and it is
accepted that an outbreak is laboratory confirmed if
reported as such. Outbreaks on each ward are treated as
distinct events. Outbreaks are considered over, if 7 days
have elapsed following the last onset date of the last
affected patient.
The reporting scheme is web-based and infection
control teams based in the hospitals enter the data dir-
ectly via a secure Internet database. Data items collected
include first and last date of onset of illness, whether
wards or bays were closed, dates of ward or bay closure,
laboratory confirmation of norovirus, ward type, the
number of patients or staff involved in the outbreak and
the number of lost bed-days. The number of lost
bed-days is the cumulative number of beds unavailable
for use for each day of closure. The closure is defined as
the restriction of new patient admissions, transfers into
or discharges from the affected unit (ward or bay within
the ward). Where a reporter chooses YES when
answering the question on ward closure, they are then
prompted to provide the date of closure and reopening.
There is no option for NO and therefore leaving this
blank assumes that no closure occurred.
Data analysis
The duration of outbreak was determined as the
number of days between the date of onset of illness of
the last patient and the date of onset of illness of the
first patient plus 1 day (because the date after the last
person was ill is the first date on which the outbreak had
finished). The duration of closure was the number of
days between the date of reopening the ward and the
date of closing the ward. The duration of disruption was
calculated as the number of days between the date of
reopening the ward and the date of onset of illness in
the first known case. Where there was no indication that
the ward had closed (the question is left blank in the
online form) we have assumed this meant there was no
closure.
Outbreak reports from community settings (such as
psychiatric units) or with no information on ward type
were not laboratory confirmed, and single outbreaks
that were recorded as involving multiple wards were
excluded from the analysis.
Statistical comparisons
We examined the duration of outbreaks, ward closures
and disruption, the number of patients and staff affected
and the number of lost bed-days, as functions of the
timing of closure. We also estimated the number of
people affected on each day of the outbreak, calculated
as the total number of people affected during the out-
break (staff plus patients) divided by the length of the
outbreak (as defined above). We also used this measure
to estimate the number of patients affected by the time
the closure occurred. Outbreaks were classified into four
groups (1) prompt closure, where closure occurred
within 3 days of the first reported date of onset of
illness, (2) closed between 4 and 6 days of the first
reported onset date, (3) closed seven or more days after
the first reported onset date and (4) not closed. Group
1, prompt closure, was the baseline group in our ana-
lysis. The 3-day cut-off for prompt closure was chosen
because the only previous study showing any association
with shorter outbreak duration used this cut-off and this
seemed a reasonable hypothesis to test.
The data on all outcome variables were right skewed
and transformation of the data did not normalise the
data, so non-parametric tests were conducted to assess
the differences between groups (Wilcoxon Rank Sum
tests for two group analysis and Kruskal-Wallace tests for
more than two groups). In the first instance, comparison
between closure groups was conducted. However, factors
such as size of the ward, ward type (elderly care ward)
and time of year (winter) might be related to the dur-
ation of outbreaks and also affect the number of people
affected during the outbreak, and confound the
2 Harris JP, Adak GK, O’Brien SJ. BMJ Open 2014;4:e003919. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2013-003919
Open Access
copyright.
 o
n
 August 22, 2019 at Newcastle University. Protected by
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/
BM
J O
pen: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2013-003919 on 9 January 2014. Downloaded from 
relationship of the apparent impact of ward closure.
Three groups for ward size were created (based on the
distribution of the number of beds reported in each
ward): small wards (≤16 beds), medium wards (17–27
beds) and large wards (≥28 beds). The comparison was
made between medians because the data are skewed
and this was a better measure than the mean.
We conducted Quasi-Poisson regression analyses to
assess the effect of ward closure (timing of closure) on
outcome measures, controlling for time of year (winter
or summer), ward size and ward type (elderly care
wards). Outbreaks where the ward size was missing are
omitted from the regression model (eg, 16% of the out-
breaks where no closure occurred). Quasi-Poisson regres-
sion provides more robust SDs than the standard Poisson
regression methods where there is evidence of over dis-
persion in the model parameters. The model used was:
logeðYÞ ¼ b0 þ b1x1 þ b2x2 þ . . . þ bnxn
where β0=intercept, β1x1=closure group, β2x2=ward size
group, etc.
The estimated outcome measure can then be calcu-
lated as:
Y ¼ (eb0)(eb1x1)(eb2x2)(ebnxn)
Backwards stepwise regression was carried out starting
with a full model including all variables and interaction
terms between variables. Variables that were not signifi-
cant (p>0.1) were excluded from each of the models.
We also tested for interactions between closure group
and other factors. Interaction terms were excluded if the
model was not significantly different from the model
without the interaction term. The most parsimonious
model including only variables that remained significant
was used as the final model for each of the analyses. All
analyses were carried out using R statistical software.11
RESULTS
Between January 2009 and December 2012, the HNORS
received 5841 reported outbreaks of diarrhoea and
vomiting. After exclusions (as outlined above) there
were 3650 laboratory-confirmed norovirus outbreaks. Of
these, 3437 (94%) could be categorised into closure
groups (as defined above). Seventy-eight per cent of out-
breaks fell into the first category. Table 1 shows the ward
characteristics by closure groups. The closure groups
were similar with regard to each of the characteristics.
There was a little difference between the ward
Table 1 Ward characteristics by closure group
Closure group
Ward characteristic
Prompt closure Closed in 4–6 days Closed in 7+ days Not closed
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Ward type
Elderly 614 (23) 65 (26) 21 (27) 92 (21)
General med 833 (31) 82 (33) 18 (23) 154 (35)
Admissions/short stay 241 (9) 11 (4) 3 (4) 31 (7)
Orthopaedic/trauma 189 (7) 13 (5) 5 (6) 29 (7)
ITU 7 (<1) 0 (0) 1 (1) 4 (1)
Respiratory/cardio 355 (13) 28 (11) 13 (16) 46 (10)
Gastroenterology 80 (3) 11 (4) 4 (5) 9 (2)
Diabetes/nephrology 120 (5) 9 (4) 1 (1) 21 (5)
Others 231 (9) 29 (12) 13 (16) 54 (12)
Total 2670 248 79 440
Ward size
<17 beds 145 (6) 13 (5) 0 (0) 34 (9)
17–27 beds 1001 (40) 116 (48) 37 (49) 145 (39)
≥28 beds 1380 (55) 112 (46) 38 (51) 191 (52)
Total 2526 241 75 370
Year
2009 419 (16) 33 (13) 18 (22) 74 (17)
2010 860 (32) 89 (36) 19 (24) 140 (32)
2011 538 (20) 61 (25) 16 (20) 104 (24)
2012 853 (32) 65 (26) 26 (33) 122 (28)
Total 2670 248 79 440
Summer/winter
Summer 565 (21) 50 (20) 11 (14) 65 (14)
Winter 2105 (79) 198 (79) 68 (86) 375 (85)
Total 2670 248 79 440
ITU, intensive care unit.
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characteristics, size and type of ward and year of out-
break and season (winter/summer) for each of the
closure groups.
Closure versus non-closure
Analysis of closed versus not closed suggested that wards
were more likely to remain open in summer χ2=7.52
p=0.006, and small wards were less likely to close com-
pared with medium or large wards χ2=6.67, p=0.01. We
did not find associations with other characteristics in this
analysis.
Closure group analysis
The median duration of outbreak, duration of disrup-
tion and the number of patients affected were lower in
outbreaks where there was a prompt closure compared
with those outbreaks where it took longer period to
close (table 2). However, the median duration of
closure, staff affected and average cases per day of out-
break were higher in the prompt closure group
(Kruskal-Wallace rank sum tests all p<0.001). Lost
bed-days was not significant.
Regression analysis
Table 3 shows the results of the regression analyses. The
models suggest that (after controlling for season, ward
size and type) the duration of outbreak and total disrup-
tion was shorter and fewer patients were affected in the
prompt closure group (group 1) compared with closure
groups 2 and 3. The duration of outbreaks where
closure occurred seven or more days after the first onset
date are almost twice as long as those where closure is
prompt (see table 3 and also online supplementary
figure S1 appendix). The duration of closure was
shorter and there were fewer cases per day in the other
closure groups compared with the prompt closure
group.
Outbreaks where wards were not closed had fewer
patients and staff affected and fewer cases per day of out-
break compared with prompt closure (the baseline
group) but there was no statistical evidence for a differ-
ence in the duration of closure.
Outbreaks occurring on larger units, on care of the
elderly wards, were significantly associated with longer
outbreaks, longer disruption and more cases in most of
the models. The number of bed-days lost was not signifi-
cantly associated with the closure group, but there was a
positive correlation with increasing ward size and a nega-
tive correlation with care of the elderly wards. We found
no evidence of interaction between closure groups and
other factors.
DISCUSSION
We approached this study from the perspective of asses-
sing whether disruption caused by outbreaks of noro-
virus can be mitigated by closing wards early. We found
that in 80% of outbreaks reported, closure occurred
promptly. This, on reflection, should not have been sur-
prising given that the guidelines produced in 2000
recommended ward closure (and in these guidelines it
was a strong recommendation) as one of the measures
to control an outbreak of diarrhoea and vomiting.12
However, these guidelines did not propose a time limit
for closure. This was first recommended by Lopman
et al,4 and at the time this study was carried out, it was
not evident that the closure occurred rapidly, at least not
in the area in which the study was conducted.
In our analysis, we have some evidence of a dose
response, whereby, closing a bay or ward promptly
(within 3 days of the first case occurring) in an outbreak
of norovirus, the duration of the outbreak is shorter
compared with the outbreaks where closure is not
prompt. The duration of the outbreaks was longer in
the closure group where closure was delayed to seven or
more days. Furthermore, when closure did occur
promptly, fewer patients were affected and the total dur-
ation of the disruption (first onset date to when the
ward is reopened) is also shorter. It might be argued
that the prompt closure during these outbreaks was
beneficial. However, the interpretation of these results is
not straightforward. Outbreaks where the ward was not
closed at all also have similar characteristics in terms of
the duration of outbreak and fewer people affected com-
pared with the baseline prompt closure group. These
Table 2 Median (and IQR) number of people affected and days of disruption by closure groups
Closure group
Outcome Prompt closure Closed in 4–6 days Closed in 7+ days Not closed
Duration of outbreak (days) 7 (4–9.75) 9 (7–12) 14 (10.75–18.25) 6 (4–11)
Total duration of disruption (days) 9 (6–12) 12 (9–14) 17 (13–20) NA
Duration of closure (days) 8 (5–11) 7 (5–10) 7 (5–10) NA
Number of patients affected 11 (7–15) 12 (9–16) 14.5 (10–18) 7 (4–11.75)
Number of staff affected 2 (0–5) 3 (1–6) 2 (1–5) 1 (0–3)
Bed-days lost 15 (7–38) 14 (7–43) 17 (6–46.5) NA
Average cases per day 2 (1.3–2.9) 1.6 (1.2–2.2) 1.2 (0.8–1.8) 1.3 (0.8–2.0)
Number of cases by time of closure 2.4 (1.5–3.8) 7.0 (5.3–10.0) 11.0 (8.3–15.0) NA
Kruskal-Wallace rank sum tests between groups were all significant p<0.001 except for lost bed-days.
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Table 3 Regression model estimates for outcome by ward characteristic (figures in brackets are 95% CIs)
Outcome
Percentage increase/decrease over baseline by characteristic
Baseline estimate
from model†
Closure group 1
(not closed)
Closure group 2
(4–6 days)
Closure group 3
(7+ days)
Ward group 2
(medium)
Ward group 3
(large)
Elderly care
ward Winter
Length of outbreak
(days)
5.93 (5.59 to 6.30)* 4 (1 to 7) 32 (27 to 38)* 99 (87 to 101)* 11 (4 to 17) 22 (15 to 29)* 18 (15 to 21)* 7 (4 to 10)**
Length of closure
(days)
6.79 (6.45 to 7.14)* – −13 (−9 to −17)* −12 (−6 to −19) 17 (11 to 23)* 28 (21 to 35)* 18 (15 to 21)* --
Total length of
disruption (days)
7.62 (7.24 to 8.01)* – 29 (23 to 34)* 82 (69 to 95)* 16 (10 to 22)* 23 (16 to 29)* 18 (15 to 21)* --
Patients affected
(number)
6.19 (5.89 to 6.52)* −24 (−22 to −27)* 12 (8 to 15)* 24 (17 to 30)* 56 (48 to 63)* 86 (76 to 95)* 12 (10 to 14)* 10 (7 to 12)*
Staff affected
(number)
2.01 (1.88 to 2.35)* −47 (−42 to −52)* 12 (3 to 21) 16 (1 to 33) 29 (15 to 43)** 24 (11 to 37)** -- 29 (21 to 36)*
Lost bed-days
(days)
13.44 (11.54 to 15.65)* – 5 (1 to 15) 24 (6 to 44) 85 (58 to 117)* 129 (96 to 167)* −17 (−12 to −22)* --
Cases per day
(number)
1.74 (1.64 to 1.85)* −24 (−21 to −28)* −22 (−12 to −26)* −43 (−37 to −49)* 37 (28 to 46)* 39 (31 to 64)* −8 (−5 to −11)** --
Cases by close
(number)
2.15 (2.00 to 2.32)* – 176 (165 to 186)* 302 (282 to 322)* 42 (31 to 53)* 40 (30 to 51)* -- --
*p<0.01 **p<0.05.
†Prompt closure (closure group 0≤3 days) in small ward (ward group 1) -=not closed, --=not significant (excluded from the model).
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findings might suggest that there is no compelling evi-
dence that closing the ward is an effective way of curtail-
ing an outbreak of norovirus.
There are limitations to this study. The analysis was
carried out on summary data collected on outbreaks
from a national web-based reporting scheme. During
data entry, there are some built-in data validation steps,
but despite this it is difficult to validate all of the data
entered and we have to accept that there might be some
errors. For example, where there was no information on
closures (where the reporter has not selected YES at the
question on whether the outbreak led to closure), we
have assumed that the ward did not close. It is conceiv-
able that in some of these outbreaks closures did occur.
In this case, the outcomes in this category (not closed)
might have been more favourable to this group, espe-
cially if the ward closed promptly.
It is also difficult to unpick some of the questions
around the ward characteristics that make for differ-
ences in the outcomes. For example, outbreaks where
wards were promptly closed might have been shorter
because they were in smaller wards and therefore were
shorter simply because the pool of susceptible patients
was small. We also assumed that all other aspects of
infection control, including increased hygiene measures,
are carried out during outbreaks and that these proce-
dures do not differ between outbreaks.
The current guidelines suggest that wards are reo-
pened following terminal cleaning, which is normally
after 72 h after the onset of the last known case.
However, we have to accept that, in some circumstances,
this might have to be altered in order to respond to
situations, for example, if there have been a number of
ward closures and there is pressure for hospitals to
reopen to provide services. We have excluded from the
analysis outbreaks on some wards which cannot close
(eg, intensive care units) for operational reasons, so
these will not have skewed the results. Furthermore,
each outbreak was limited only to one ward, because we
ask for outbreaks on each ward to report separately, and
this might not have been the case for every outbreak.
Although we were able to exclude outbreaks where it
was clear from the report that the outbreak involved
more than one ward, it is possible that some outbreaks
spread from one ward to another. In this case, our esti-
mate of the duration of the outbreak might be shorter
than the actual event. The current approaches to collect
samples during outbreaks of norovirus, where several
samples are collected from the beginning of the out-
break and subsequent cases are not always sampled, mili-
tate against answering the question about spread
between wards. Methods have been developed which
can determine these transmission events13 14 and it is
now possible to show if the virus has been passed from
one person to another or if patients have contracted the
virus from separate introductions. In order to under-
stand the transmission events and the way in which the
virus can spread throughout a hospital, a dedicated
study would be needed where samples are taken from
patients who fall ill on each ward, along with more
detailed data on onset times and position on the ward
when the person became ill.
The analysis of number of cases per day (although
limited because it is essentially an average) suggests that
some outbreaks were ‘slow burning’ in which there are a
just a few new cases occurring each day of the outbreak.
This might explain the differences in the data, whereby
the longer it takes to close a ward the longer the out-
break lasts and more patients are affected overall. In all
outbreaks where closure occurred, the duration of
closure is similar, suggesting that the act of closing is
beneficial contributing to curtailing the outbreak. The
number of cases occurring during an outbreak might
not follow an even progression, sometimes several cases
can come to light on 1 day and 1 or 2 days elapse
between the next cases. However, it is not possible to tell
this from summary data; again one would need more
data on individual onset dates and the number of new
cases on each day of the outbreak and this would
require an observational study. Norovirus has a short
incubation period and the estimated serial interval is
short (possibly around 2 days)15 so it would not be
unreasonable to expect many cases to occur in the first
few days of an outbreak.
For our analysis, we had a dataset considerably larger
than that used in the study by Lopman et al. A major dif-
ference with our data is the finding that, in the majority
of outbreaks, wards were closed within 3 days. In the
study by Lopman et al, the wards that were in the
prompt closure group accounted for only 14% of the
outbreaks analysed. Moreover, the non-prompt closure
group was comprised of outbreaks where wards were not
closed and those that closed later than 3 days.
We also restricted our analysis to outbreaks that were
laboratory confirmed as due to norovirus; therefore, it is
unlikely that these outbreaks would have atypical
characteristics to those not associated with norovirus
infections. What is evident from our analysis is that ward
size and elderly care wards had an independent effect
on the length of outbreaks. Lopman et al found that the
number of beds on a ward and elderly care wards was
related to an increased hazard of outbreaks occurring.2
Our analyses have implications for the control of noro-
virus in hospitals and other closed settings such as care
homes. The finding that larger ward size is associated
with increased duration of outbreaks fits in with other
studies which suggested that enclosing bays and putting
doors on bays were beneficial and shortened the dur-
ation of outbreaks.7 8
In the USA, outbreaks in hospitals are rarely reported
and hospitals tend to have single or double occupied
rooms rather than large wards. The notable feature in a
large hospital outbreak reported in the USA was the
high ratio of staff to patients affected and the higher
attack rates in staff compared with patients.3 Patients are
more likely to spread norovirus infections during
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outbreaks in enclosed settings rather than healthcare
workers16 and there is good evidence that proximity of
patients to one another15 and vomiting are the likely
principle driver of outbreaks.17 18 Furthermore, the time
it takes for an infected person to infect another shortens
as an epidemic unfolds.19 In a ward with many beds, it is
easy to see how this could cause an outbreak to infect a
large number of patients. If bays were enclosed with
solid physical barriers such as doors and floor to ceiling
walls, this effectively creates small rooms in which
onward transmission can be more easily prevented.
Is it still reasonable to suggest that closing a ward or
bay is an effective tool in curtailing an outbreak of noro-
virus? It has been previously shown that it is difficult to
evaluate the effectiveness of individual infection control
methods.6 It is likely that they are effective only when
introduced together (in today’s parlance as a bundle).
One aspect of infection control is closing an affected
area and reducing the risk of further exposure to other
patients. Taking the decision to close an area is a tacit
indicator to staff working in the area and serves to
heighten the awareness of a problem and the need to
implement infection control procedures. Leaving a ward
open while patients are symptomatic increases the risk
of exposing newly admitted patients. If these newly
exposed patients are subsequently moved to another
part of the hospital, they are likely to contribute to
onward transmission. The duration of closure was
similar in all of the closure groups, suggesting this is an
effective strategy particularly in larger wards, and during
winter when outbreaks are more common.
What this analysis of the HNORS data provides is a
baseline to judge how outbreaks of norovirus might
unfold should hospitals begin to change their infection
control strategy away from whole-ward closures as the
new guidelines suggest. One of the strengths of surveil-
lance data is its sustainability which allows for continu-
ous collection of consistent data relatively cheap.
Continued monitoring of the HNORS data in the
future, in light of the recent changes to the guidance,
would show if the burden of norovirus outbreaks
changes, particularly in terms of increased duration and
patients affected.
Conclusion
A prompt action is required in order to help control
outbreaks of norovirus. However, more detailed studies
can help to unravel the complexities around ward
characteristics and help to explain why some outbreaks
tend to come to an end without further action. This
would entail collection of information on ward type,
number of cases on each day of the outbreak, position
in the ward when the patient became ill, whether the
patient had been moved in the 24–48 h prior to symp-
toms and how many patients had become symptomatic
before the closure.
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